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Legal and Political Responses in Brazil to COVID-19
In the first half of January 2021, Brazil had already counted more than 200,000
deaths and 8 million people diagnosed with COVID-19. Throughout 2020, the
responses from the federal government, which should have taken on a coordination
role considering the federalised National Health Service (SUS, Sistema Único
de Saúde), were confusing and inefficient. Doubts and scepticism spread by the
federal executive undermined the work of governors and mayors and, mirroring the
American example, contributed to increase the number of cases and casualties.
As we have previously shown in this blog, the legal basis for responding to the
COVID-19 pandemic is the Act 13.979 of 2020. Throughout 2020, the act has
been reformed several times, though President Bolsonaro vetoed some of the
changes. Parts of the act were subject to judicial review in the Federal Supreme
Court. Generally, the act recognizes the federal dimension of the 1988 Constitution
provisions on the protection of health.
Governors and mayors had to produce their own regulations following the federal
legislative model. The Federal Supreme Court, when adjudicating cases on the
president’s competence to define essential activities that could not be halted during
the pandemic (ADI 6.341), criticized the inaction of the federal government, which
can undermine state and local measures aiming at the protection of their citizens. On
the court’s judgment, the federal legislation produced by National Congress cannot
reduce the power of the states and municipalities to provide health services. Despite
recognizing that the federal authority has coordinating powers on these matters,
the Federal Supreme Court preserved the competences of governors and mayors.
Afterwards, the National Congress modified the Act 13.979 (via Act 14.035 of 2020)
to, again, reinforce the federal character of the protection of health in Brazil.
The relationship between state branches in those cases demonstrates how the
COVID-19 pandemic required immediate responses that the executive authority
refused to present. The action of states, municipalities and other branches of the
federal government worked to curb the federal government’s lethal politics, although
more could have been done for holding federal authorities accountable for their
acts. In the following sections, we attempt to demonstrate how Brazilian institutions
reacted to President Bolsonaro’s irresponsible approach to COVID-19. The critical
tone adopted here points out that more could be done to avoid the high death and
contamination toll.
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Brazilian Executive and the Pandemic
2020’s global fight against COVID-19 pandemic was marked by both Donald Trump
and Jair Bolsonaro’s sceptical and confusing views on the existence, seriousness
and responses to the pandemic. Although some theoretical work has already been
done to understand their policies as deliberate omission – executive underreach
– more can be said about the contradictory ways by which the pandemic was
politically confronted. The Brazilian president has called the COVID-19 disease a
‘little flu’, engaged on several occasions in meetings and public manifestations that
disregarded social distance measures (including several ones attacking Brazilian
institutions, such as the National Congress and the Federal Supreme Court),
shrugged off the death toll, spent significant amounts of money producing ineffective
drugs, such as chloroquine, to treat the disease without scientific evidence, raised
doubts against and criticized the use of vaccines, and lead to an unnecessary
confrontation with governors about the best moment to start a vaccination program.
In the end of 2020, the federal government still lacked an adequate plan for buying,
distributing and inoculating vaccines throughout the huge Brazilian territory.
Three factors must be considered when analysing the Brazilian federal government’s
approach to COVID-19. The first factor is the irrationality of Bolsonarism, the political
movement that brings together Bolsonaro’s supporters. Given the lack of any
rational constraints on their action and judgments, Bolsonarists feel free to engage
passionately with the president’s pronouncements. Bolsonaro’s extremely radical
views find resonance all over the country because of their emotional appeal. They
are generally associated with guns, death, and certain abhorrent passions which
bring together people with different worldviews but a shared scepticism about reason
and a similar authoritarian mindset. According to a Brazilian political analyst, there
would be only Bolsonarists (Bolsonaro’s supporters), instead of a consistent set of
ideas called Bolsonarism. Nonetheless, a common background is that Bolsonaro’s
supporters hold extremely individualistic views about political morality and have
very little sense of shared or political responsibility. When faced with President
Bolsonaro’s coronavirus denial, they regard themselves as “free” or “liberated”
to pursue their own individualistic agendas without the burden of judging what is
best for the polity or restraining their action for a common good. In other words, by
defying science and denying the efficacy of vaccines, lockdowns, and the like, or
offering easy exits for the pandemic, President Bolsonaro discharges his followers
of several burdens and responsibilities that might impose rational constraints on
their unregulated whim. He promises his followers unrestricted freedom and allows
them to blame others (who illegitimately purport to restrict this freedom) for the
economic consequences of the disease. Pragmatically, the president’s strategy
has led Bolsonarists to act in a coordinated way and has managed to keep the
presidential support in the range of 30% of the Brazilian population.
The second salient factor that must be considered when analyzing the executive
branch’s approach to the pandemic is the engagement of military personnel in
his government. After dismissing two civilian health ministers that adopted a
technical approach to the pandemic, the president nominated a military for the
office, General Eduardo Pazuello. As Minister for Health, Pazuello showed a canine
- 2 -
fidelity to President Bolsonaro. When Minister Pazuello first attempted to acquire
CoronaVac vaccines from the government of the state of São Paulo, Bolsonaro
ordered the suspension of the purchase, on ideological grounds. While the official
justification for this measure was based on the absence of sufficient tests, the
unofficial rhetoric, widely disclosed in Bolsonarist social networks and reinforced by
some of Bolsonaro’s statements, is that any Chinese vaccine should be rejected as a
suspicious medicine. In effect, Bolsonarism’s ideological battle against an imaginary
global communist threat led to a paralysis in the adoption of a national immunization
plan. In mid-January 2021, while the first draft of this post was written, there was
still no concrete plan for acquisition and distribution of vaccines in a large scale.
States such as São Paulo kept on pressing the federal authorities to accelerate
the procedures in the Sanitary Surveillance National Agency (ANVISA – Agência
Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária), also commanded by a military officer.
On January 17th, however, President Bolsonaro suffered an important defeat:
the Agency formally authorized the emergency use of the 7 million doses of the
Chinese vaccine. The Governor of the state of São Paulo, João Dória, began the
immunization programme in the state just a few minutes after this measure. The
vaccination campaign began immediately and Bolsonaro’s coronavirus-denial
discourse suffered a significant retreat. It is hard to measure, however, the actual
impact of this fact in Bolsonaro’s anti-scientific crusade.
The relationship between the armed forces and the presidency is still a major
problem for Brazilian constitutionalism. Bolsonaro’s government reveals that, in
addition to legitimacy issues, technical incompetence is a hallmark of the Brazilian
military personnel. That is a bigger problem if one considers that not only the federal
armed forces, but also state military policemen generally support the president and
its authoritarian moves.
The third factor that should be considered when discussing the executive politics on
the pandemic is related to the first one. Bolsonaro adopted a clearly contradictory
approach to the pandemic. While he often refuses to admit the gravity of the disease
and its capacity to infect, at other times he adopts risky solutions aiming at potential
political gains. His decision to supporting chloroquine is an example. Despite the
absence of scientific  evidence of its efficacy against the virus, Bolsonaro replicated
Trump’s anti-scientific rhetoric.
His radical rhetoric suffers from a wide range of contradictions, which can be
easily identified. If COVID-19 is only a ‘small flu’, why care about a treatment
without evidence of efficacy? By the same token, the president took a stand against
obligatory vaccination, at the same time that announced that a national plan for the
vaccines was almost ready in the end of December 2020.
All of these factors give a glimpse of the chaotic Brazilian federal politics towards
COVID-19.
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Legislative and Judicial Responses to the Federal
Chaos
The National Congress has taken a different approach towards COVID-19. The
creation of a national financial aid was approved in opposition to Bolsonaro’s
original proposal for a significantly lower aid. In addition, Bolsonaro tried to veto
the mandatory use of masks in public spaces such as commercial and industrial
instalments, religious temples and schools. He also intended that companies would
not be obligated to supply masks for their employees. The National Congress
overturned the vetoes, as it did in several other circumstances during Bolsonaro’s
government.
The Federal Supreme Court played a pivotal role to secure the constitutional
legitimacy of the measures against COVID-19 – the case law was published in
English. The court restricted police raids in Rio de Janeiro’s shantytowns during
the pandemic. It reinforced the constitutional protection of indigenous people by
demanding that the federal government offered adequate health policies concerning
the pandemic. The structural decision ordered the federal government to present a
plan for protecting the indigenous populations – at least twice, the Justice rapporteur,
Roberto Barroso, rejected the plans presented by Bolsonaro’s government. Based
on the constitutional right to access to information, the Federal Supreme Court struck
down provisions that restricted the publicization of COVID-19 governmental data.
The court demanded that public servants obey to scientific and technical criteria
when applying measures that envisioned the control of the pandemic. It allowed the
states and municipalities to rely on technical and scientific data obtained by them to
base their health measures, and not only those collected by the central government.
The same federal principle allowed that states and municipalities restricted the
circulation of people to avoid the virus’ spread.
In other important cases, the Federal Supreme Court (i) prevented the central
government from requesting ventilators bought by a state, (ii) rejected a claim that
provisional measures (that is, executive decrees with statutory force issued by
the president) could have their validity indefinetely extended during the pandemic,
and (iii) ruled that federal and state governments can impose restrictive measures
(alternative to the enforced vaccination) on those who refuse to take vaccines
against COVID-19. The court authorized, for instance,  limitations on transportation
or prohibitions of access to certain public places.
There were, however, certain problematic rulings and controversial measures
adopted by Brazilian courts and judges. The Federal Supreme Court sustained
a provision that authorized hour reduction and salary cut without trade union’s
authorization – a decision that goes against the text of the 1988 Constitution.
The court was  fiercely criticized, in addition, when it requested certain research
foundations to give priority to judges and public servants in the distribution of
vaccines.
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Brazilian Federal System and COVID-19 Politics
The 1988 Constitution designed a system for the protection of health based
on shared powers and cooperative action among the federal entities. As it was
mentioned before, federal executive’s inaction led to more participation of the
states and the municipalities. Instead of the central government assuming a role of
coordination of health politics, we observed a conflict in the federal system, which
led to several cases being brought to the Federal Supreme Court – which, in those
cases, responded quickly and with a rational basis. The court, following provisions
of the Act 13.979 of 2020, allowed that states and municipalities use their vaccines
in cases of omission of the central government. Additionally, in case there is no
authorization of the Sanitary Surveillance National Agency, those federal entities
could initiate a vaccination campaign based on foreign registrations.
Right from the start of the pandemic, almost all states signed a public letter
requesting a proper response by the federal government. That was not a sufficient
step and most of the conflicts gained political dimension when they should not –
consider the debate on the efficacy of the Chinese vaccine. The Federal Supreme
Court was provoked and federal matters became judicialized.
Human Rights and Civil Liberties
The right to health and personal integrity was deliberately attacked by the omissions
of the federal government. Although Bolsonaro still remains popular in some
segments of the Brazilian society, his accountability for the high death and infection
tolls should be considered by the National Congress. With this scenario in mind,
the president approached traditional parties in order to gain their sympathy and
avoid future impeachment processes. On the international level, Bolsonaro’s harmful
approach against the indigenous people was brought to the International Criminal
Court with few chances to thrive – however, it can spark an important debate on the
reach of the notion of crimes against humanity.
In the domestic level, other rights were violated, such as the right to information
concerning the numbers and data related to the pandemic. The Federal Supreme
Court was able to neutralize, in a significant measure, the harmful practice of the
federal government.
On balancing, Bolsonarists continue to argue that COVID-19 measures
disproportionally violate the right to property and the right to free initiative. They
therefore resist the shutting of public spaces, bars, restaurants, and so on, to foster
social distancing. Courts have generally rejected this view.
2021 Outlook for Brazil
2021 started with new waves of COVID-19 spreading in Brazil. At the same time,
Bolsonaro insistent on his familiar exemption of responsibility. Hospitals in the city
of Manaus ran out of oxygen for patients. As several patients died of suffocation,
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President Bolsonaro’s comments were limited to praise his government for doing
their share instead of proposing any concrete solution. In his declarations, one can
easily see the individualistic and also lethal Bolsonarist logic.
Brazil has an enormous challenge for the years to come. Bolsonaro’s government
was efficient to accelerate a process of deterioration of Brazilian constitutional
institutions: it captured state accountability agencies, it attacked the press and public
universities, it fragilized scientific organs and professionals, and so on. 2020 was
also a year in which true coup’s attempts were not effective only because of the
absence of a genuine support from the armed forces or the resistance of the majority
of the population. Considering the COVID-19 pandemic and the federal executive
underreach, Bolsonaro’s attitudes will surely delay the decreasing of the number
of deaths and cases. Although no emergency powers were, until now, invoked, the
slow cooking of Brazilian constitutional democracy will require that the National
Congress, the Federal Supreme Court and federal prosecutors adopt a much more
vigilant approach to contain the federal government. The obstacle, however, is
that Bolsonarism can have already infected those institutions. It remains with the
democratic society the task to heal Brazilian constitutionalism.
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